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means rather that 'Verstiindnis' is a logical side of any actual verstehen itself, as 
far as the latter is contrasted to the possibility of Unverstiindnis: that is to say, 
to be out of the game of verstehen as to what is at stake, due to lack of practice. 
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Understanding, Understanding Oneself, 
Self-Understanding 
Hermeneutic Considerations Proceeding from Wilhelm Dilthey 
Abstract: Wilhelm Dilthey defines the specific nature of understanding utilizing 
two aspects: on the one hand, understanding is a comprehension of connections, 
typically regarding the relation between a whole and its parts. Understanding 
captures the meaning of something according to this relation: We understand an 
episode from its function within a story, a text from its words and sentences. On 
the other hand, understanding consists of understanding something as an expres-
sion. We understand cultural and historical facts as objectifications of individual 
and social life. The triad life-expression-understanding forms the structural frame-
work of hermeneutics. Eventually, understanding implies self-understanding. 
Therefore autobiography, for Dilthey, is the paradigm of understanding. 
Keywords: understanding, understanding oneself, explaining, reference, 
autobiography 
1 Understanding and Explaining 
"Nature we explain, the mind we understand."1 Thus Wilhelm Dilthey - as do 
other neo-Kantian philosophers - characterises the difference between the 
human and the natural sciences in his 1894 Ideas for a Descriptive and Analytic 
Psychology. The accentuation of the concept of understanding makes clear that 
Dilthey does not use it in the ordinary, common- sensically broad sense. In such 
a broad sense, understanding means grasping relations of any kind, in various 
domains of reality. Here, the concepts of understanding and explaining have 
overlapping scopes - they do not stand in opposition to one another. Dilthey 
obviously has a narrower concept of understanding in mind, where understand-
ing aims at mental or 'inner' things and proceeds from their innermost core, such 
as a motivation or an intention. This conception of understanding is often asso-
ciated with certain cognitive acts, such as empathising with another or putting 
1 Dilthey, 1990, 139-240, here p. 144; Dilthey, 2010, 115-210. 
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oneself in another's shoes, but is also dismissed in philosophy of science.2 In 
many contexts, we are familiar with speaking of genuine understanding that 
comprehends the sense of its object rather than merely registering or classifying 
it. Equally, the aforementioned differentiation of methods has remained up to the 
present in manifold variations, e.g. in opposing phenomenological and empirical 
description, internal and external perspective, or quantitative and qualitative 
analyses, and in the debate concerning the naturalisation of the mind. We owe 
a systematically elaborated position in exploring this terrain to Wilhelm Dilthey. 
In his Introduction to the Human Sciences from 1883, 3 Dilthey decisively articulates 
the project of re-establishing the human sciences, aiming at liberating them both from 
their "old subservience to metaphysics" and their "new subordination to the natural 
science". 4 Pivotal elements of this foundation are the "inner experience" and the "facts 
of consciousness". Its point of reference, however, is not the abstract intellect and its 
functions, but the whole human being as "this willing, feeling, representing being"; 
not "mere representation", but "life".5 Thus, Dilthey's re-foundational project marks 
a significant shift away from established epistemology. In The Formation of the Histor-
ical World in the Human Sciences, Dilthey systematically carries out the foundation he 
has announced in the Introduction, at the same time postulating an emphatic concept 
of understanding that considers understanding not as an isolated intellectual opera-
tion, but as being intimately coupled with life. The "connection oflife, expression and 
understanding" constitutes the structural core of the human sciences: facts about the 
historical and cultural world are its object "insofar as [therein] human states are being 
experienced, become manifest in articulations of life, and insofar as these expres-
sions are understood. "6 Explicating the act of understanding in its specific logic and 
systematic significance must proceed from this structure. 
2 Internal Perspective and Reference 
to the Subject 
Understanding something - in contrast to merely noticing and describing it from an 
external perspective - means engaging with the internal perspective of that which is 
2 The locus classicus being Abel, 1948, 211-218. 
3 Dilthey, 1966, XVII. English: Dilthey, 1989. 
4 Dilthey, 1966, XV. 
5 Dilthey, 1966, XVII-XIX. 
6 Dilthey, 1970, English: Dilthey, 2010a, Works III. Page numbers in the following text refer to 
the German edition. 
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to be understood. Paradigmatically, it means understanding something as a subject's 
expression or utterance. The utterance can be a report by which the subject wants to 
give a piece of information. Here, it is possible to ask what the subject 'means', what 
the utterance - or the subject, respectively- 'intends to say'. But the utterance can be 
made without an intention to give a piece of information; it can articulate a wish, an 
intention, a mood, whose manifestation thus becomes the utterance itself. In each 
case, understanding means grasping the utterance from the wishing, intending, or 
acting subject's perspective. Understanding means comprehending which action 
someone performs with a particular instance of behaviour, with a certain movement 
of his body. Understanding involves a fundamentally reflexive approach to its object 
insofar as it accounts for the sense the utterance has for its subject. 
Yet, understanding does not imply referring to the subject's conscious inten-
tion. It is possible that the subject expresses or communicates something to others 
without being aware of it, much less being able to name it. His intention can be 
unclear to himself, he can be wrong about what he expresses, or even about what 
he means or actually wants. In extreme cases, such as understanding an ideolog-
ically biased subject or a pathological symptom, an act of understanding retains 
reservations concerning what the acting and speaking subject means. This kind 
of understanding is the topic of Paul Ricreur's hermeneutics of suspicion. But 
also in the 'ordinary' case, understanding cannot simply rely on the subject's 
manifest intention. The author's intention is not the ultimate yardstick for sub-
stantially interpreting a text. More generally, the acting and speaking subject con-
fronts the problem of becoming clear about what his utterance ought to express 
prior to making an utterance with a definite sense. Utterances equally serve to 
clarify one's own thoughts and doings as they serve to communicate the result. 
The purpose of looking for the right expression, that is, does not only consist in 
finding the right way of putting one's thoughts into words or one's intentions 
into action, but first and foremost in shaping one's thoughts and intentions with 
clarity and precision. Understanding must take an utterance's provisional char-
acter into account insofar as it aims at disclosing what the subject really means 
or wants. Nonetheless, understanding in this case, too, means grasping the sense 
an utterance has in principle for the subject and from the subject's point of view, 
i.e. even if the subject himself is not entirely clear about that very sense. 
In a broader sense, this model of understanding also applies to understanding 
artefacts, cultural practices, and institutions. Identifying a convention as a gradua-
tion ceremony, conceiving an instance of handshaking as a greeting or agreement, 
amounts to grasping the respective meanings of these events. Describing them ade-
quately must account for their self-description, i.e. the way in which the subjects who 
are involved in the practice at issue, concerned by a story or operating with a certain 
object, would themselves describe their doings. Although this self-description 
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can be disputable or false, it ontologically belongs to the object of understanding, 
and understanding the object covers more than registering its objectively meas-
urable characteristics. It equally covers grasping the object's being embedded in 
functional connections to acting, suffering and expressing subjects. As a minimal 
condition, understanding comprises grasping objects within a subject's spaces of 
experience, action and resonance with reference to the subject himself. This is what 
distinguishes understanding from non-understanding descriptions most broadly. 
This minimal condition, however, does not specify as to what understanding 
itself, as a cognitive operation, is, how this operation 'works', what enables it to 
grasp its object, and what it is in which its genuine capacity of disclosing consists. 
3 Understanding as Understanding Connections 
We can approach an answer to these questions by drawing on conceptions expli-
cating understanding not primarily in terms of relevance to the subject, but in 
terms of objectively obtaining relations. As a minimal definition along these 
lines, understanding means grasping a connection. Understanding primar-
ily and genuinely understands connections.7 It establishes intelligibility, i.e. it 
renders a phenomenon or a theory intelligible by emphasising certain relations 
in such a manner that the object of understanding gains a certain shape and is 
illuminated in a certain way. This presents a common denominator of all kinds of 
understanding and explaining which differ with respect to the factors and rela-
tions they consider relevant, and the disputation thereof constitutes the dispu-
tation of scientific methods. A particular variety of understanding connections, 
i.e. as understanding contexts, is presented in Wilhelm Dilthey's model which 
interprets the context as a context of meaning and explicates understanding as 
understanding meaning. 
The paradigmatic object of this kind of understanding is a story; the paradig-
matic framework according to which the manifold is grasped in its connectedness 
is the relation of parts and whole. This relation, ever since a fundamental schema 
of ontology, equally presents a privileged hinge between logical-ontological and 
hermeneutic conceptions. The interplay between part and whole is reflected in 
the figure of the hermeneutic circle. Understanding unfolds in their interdepend-
ence, in which the part "has meaning only in its connectedness with the whole", 
and "the whole only exists for us insofar as it becomes intelligible from its parts. 
7 Oliver Scholz, 2016, 17-32. 
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Understanding always hovers between both perspectives". 8 Proceeding from 
either side, i.e. from the side of the part or of the whole, their relation illuminates 
aspects that are genuinely relevant for understanding. 
Proceeding from the whole, the real constitution of the context at issue comes 
into view. Dilthey specifies it as a "context of effects'',9 defining it by the agency 
of a creating and expressing life. Coupling the relation of the whole to the part 
with the idea of force and its expression opens the possibility of simultaneously 
grasping this relation according to the relationship between the inner and the 
outer, the expressed and its expression, which is fundamental to hermeneutics. 
Life, insofar as it yields effects, expresses itself in these; as a whole, it becomes 
manifest in individual "objectifications of life"10 that constitute the object of the 
human sciences. Proceeding from the other side, the part, the relation, primarily 
appears as a context of cognition and understanding in which it is intertwined 
with the category of meaning. Understanding something as a part of a whole, 
as an episode of a story, means grasping its significance for the whole, its func-
tion for what happens on a more comprehensive level, e.g. its functioning as the 
beginning, the inversion, or the completion of a project. This description of under-
standing converges with a hermeneutic connection by its phrasing only. Grasping 
something in its function for something else means presenting it in its meaning or 
meaningfulness for the latter: The functional relation is projected onto an episte-
mological relation, in which meaning is a correlate of understanding. 
With respect to the original question, it remains open as to what under-
standing, grasped as understanding meaning, consists in, and to what extent the 
aforementioned reflexivity and subject-relatedness is brought to bear. Moreover, 
the relation between the two directions of understanding, proceeding from the 
whole and from the part, is still in need of explication, and so is the question 
as to whether and in which sense they reach beyond the circularity of mutual 
reference. 
4 Sense and Meaning 
Now it becomes clear that Dilthey here does not merely envision a symmetric 
reflection. This may seem so at the surface insofar as we understand something 
in the light of its larger context which we in tum interpret with respect to its ele-
8 Dilthey, 1970, 288. 
9 Dilthey, 1970, 186. 
10 Dilthey, 1970, 180. 
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ments. In some sense, this inversion is inevitable insofar as the first direction of 
understanding may involve several stages and is potentially open-ended: A story 
presenting the horizon of meaning for a particular event is understood as a part of 
a larger process and so forth. We can continue this interpretation as an iterating 
interlacing of different levels up to the vanishing point of universal history which, 
itself being all-encompassing, is explicable only in the reverse direction, by refer-
ence to the framework of its constitutive elements. So far, we are concerned with 
two complementary, oppositely proceeding implementations of understanding 
within the framework provided by the relation between part and whole. However, 
Dilthey does not content himself with this way of closing the regress. Rather, he 
answers the seemingly aporetic question as to how the whole ought to be under-
stood in itself with a conceptual differentiation: He distinguishes the meaning of 
the part from the sense inherent in the "whole as the bearer of values and pur-
poses" .11 The meaning refers to the relevance of a part within a whole whereas the 
sense concerns the whole as such: We understand the relevance of an episode, 
and the sense of a story. 
Admittedly, the terminological distinction of sense and meaning itself is 
not very illuminating for the problem, the more so since Dilthey himself does 
not strictly observe it and since it has not prevailed in either everyday or scien-
tific language (though there have been suggestions made to this effect, e.g. by 
Frege12). Conceptually, Dilthey connects this distinction with a differentiation 
concerning the temporal orientation of life. Accordingly, we grasp the meaning 
of life by retrospective remembering whereas, in the present, we experience the 
positive or negative value of things and extend to the future in the category of pur-
pose.13 That is, understanding meaning originally occurs in instances of referring 
to the past. Importantly, the narrowest unity of the context of life is constituted 
in instances of this kind of reference, whereas the various purposes and values 
forming our lives when relating to present and future remain separate, side by 
side.14 Alongside its temporal form, another structural characteristic of under-
standing is important, which relates to the aforementioned reflexivity: the sub-
ject-referentiality inherent in understanding. The sense of history, in contrast to 
the meaning of its parts, does not consist in having meaning-for-something-else. 
11 Dilthey, 1970, 206. 
12 Frege (1898), 1980, 56-78. Frege distinguishes the meaning of a name (the object it refers to) 
from the sense of an expression or sentence (the way in which the object is presented), as in his 
famous example of the planet Venus that is presented as the morning or the evening star, respec-
tively, depending on the time of day at which it is observed. 
13 Dilthey, 1970, 248. 
14 Dilthey, 1970, 248f., 292. 
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It is nothing but the sense of history in and for itself. The sense of history does 
not exceed history, but refers back to it, in a sense back into it. More precisely, the 
sense of history must be determined as sense-for-the-subject whereby the subject 
here needs not be thought of as an actual agent, but rather serves as the formal 
subject of reference of history. It presents what is at issue in a story and whose 
history is constituted in a particular course of events. 
That the whole in this way refers back to the elements whose collective 
entirety it constitutes - as the story refers back to the subject whose story is at 
issue and which constitutes its identity from within the story - is, as Dilthey 
emphasises, an essential trait of understanding. In virtue of the connection 
life-expression-understanding, understanding proceeds from the part to the 
whole, relating the "outer, the particular event to something inner" whose 
expression it is. Transitioning from part to whole does not reduce to a simple 
process of going out, but extends to the actions of returning, going into oneself. 
Referring back to the inner, however, is more than structurally adjusting to the 
centre. It constitutes the core of a personal self-relation which, again, is a condi-
tion for the unified whole in question. The parts of a context of life belong to one 
another only insofar as they refer to a person, a "self", and a life, to which they 
"belong".15 The reference to the subject in question is more than an outer refer-
ence to a subject for whom the parts are meaningful. Rather, it is a reference to 
a self which is realised eventually as self-reference. That the unity of the context 
in which sense is established and the identity of the subject are related must be 
conceived from an internal perspective, from the subject's point of view whose 
life-story is at issue.16 What it is that actually constitutes the unity of the story 
and the sense of the whole cannot, in the end, be disclosed other than by ref-
erence to the subject's self-referentiality. Just as the subject is not isolable from 
its story, the form the story takes cannot be separated from the reference to the 
subject of the story and its self-relatedness.17 
15 Dilthey, 1970, 301, 240. 
16 Similarly, Heidegger relates the world's "connectedness of involvement" and the "signifi-
cance" of understanding to the human being as their eventual "for-the-sake-of-which": Heideg-
ger, 1962, §§31, 69. 
17 Paul Ricceur presents the inseparability of the constitution of the subject from the story 
whilst simultaneously highlighting the interplay of two forms of narrative identity, which he 
specifies as "memete" and "ipseite": Ricceur, 1985, 352-358; Ricceur, 1990, 167-180. 
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5 Autobiography and Self-Understanding 
The intimate connectedness between the subject and its story constitutes the core 
of Dilthey's eminent thesis, which emphasises the privileged status of the auto-
biography: "The autobiography is the utmost and most instructive form in which 
we encounter the understanding of life" .18 The core of this connectedness is the 
internal entanglement of life and its reflexive self-presentation. Historical life is 
not exhausted by being subject to an outer process of becoming, but always takes 
place in the dimensions of realising, remembering and projecting oneself. (A sub-
ject's) Story and history do not proceed in separation from each other, they mutu-
ally permeate one another, as existentially reassuring oneself is not different from 
one's conduct of life, but an integral element of it. It is important to note that the 
connectedness in question is a bidirectional one and must be read as such. As life 
is not lived independently of becoming self-aware and orienting oneself reflex-
ively, reflection, too, is not accomplished in separation from the internal motion 
and self-referentiality of life. 
Dilthey emphasises this issue with respect to the logic of historiography, 
whose way of unifying and structuring its matter is modelled on and rooted in the 
way individual lives are shaped. Here, "a context has been formed in life itself" 
by life's integrating the multitude of particular experiences into selective struc-
tures: "That is, the work of historiography has been halfway done by life itself" .19 
Yet, this is not only about the premises of historiography. The concept of auto-
biography paradigmatically stands for the irreducibility of relating to oneself in 
understanding. True understanding has to recognise and articulate the manifes-
tations of life from the subject's self-referential perspective as the medium of the 
subject's expressing itself and giving shape to its life. 
Before I come to tracing how this thought is reflected in Dilthey's theory of the 
human sciences, I want to extend the self-referentiality of understanding with a 
further step, thereby going beyond Dilthey's conception. Interlocking understand-
ing and understanding oneself, Dilthey in substance touches considerations in 
existential hermeneutics which, coming from the other side, conceives of under-
standing as a fundamental principle of being oneself as a subject. Continuously 
developing a picture and an understanding of oneself and the world belongs to 
human life. Understanding oneself means more than formal self-reference or 
knowledge of one's own states and characteristics. It rather amounts to a kind 
of self-exploration aiming at theoretically and practically exploring and coming 
18 Dilthey, 1970, 246. 
19 Dilthey, 1970, 247. 
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to terms with oneself. The scope of its manifestations ranges from biographical 
remembering and searching one's conscience to psychoanalytic self-enlightenment 
and active self-understanding which includes projecting oneself, critically scruti-
nising oneself, and constructive self-formation. Human existence takes place in 
the dimensions of understanding and self-understanding which converge to the 
achievement of an understanding way of reflecting on oneself. Paul Ricreur has 
articulated this basic thought as a hermeneutic of the self; Charles Taylor has 
shaped the phrase of human beings as self-interpreting animals; Dieter Henrich 
has spelled out the concept of self-understanding (Selbstverstiindigung) as the 
guiding idea of subjective being-oneself.20 Self-understanding is both the envi-
ronmental realisation of understanding and the mutual permeation of life and 
reflection in individual cases: It is a kind of self-understanding that is equally con-
stitutive for as it roots in and develops from one's conduct of life. 
6 The Objectifications of Life and the 
Human Sciences 
The triad life-expression-understanding articulates the origin of the self-referen-
tiality of life as well as the foundation of the human sciences. Dilthey defines 
their unified object as the "objectification of life". 21 Clearly, his theory follows the 
general line of Hegel's philosophy of spirit wherein the cultural-historical world 
presents nothing but the external realisation of spirit in the world. Dilthey's 
theorem of the objectification of life apparently transforms the Hegelian con-
ception of the objective spirit. The forms objective spirit materially adopts - for 
instance, political institutions or the force of history - instantiate it as it proceeds 
from subjective interiority to manifest realisation in the world. However, the 
transformation between Hegel and Dilthey involves a significant shift of immedi-
ate concern for the thought developed in the foregoing. 
Among the objectifications of life, Dilthey does not only count what Hegel 
treats as 'objective spirit', but also what he treats as 'absolute spirit'. Hegel distin-
guished the dimensions of arts, religion, science and philosophy from the insti-
tutions in which spirit is realised in the world as those dimensions in which spirit 
reassures itself and appears in its self-explication. The difference is analogous 
to the difference between the two uses of the word 'culture' in contemporary 
20 Ricreur, 1990, 27ff.; Taylor, 1985, 45-76; Henrich, 1999; Henrich, 2001; Henrich, 2007. 
21 Dilthey, 1970, 177f. 
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language. In the broad sense used in cultural studies, 'culture' as opposed to 
'nature' refers to whatever is the work of human beings, from street-building to 
opera. In the narrow sense, as implied by the terms 'cultural affairs' or 'depart-
ment of culture', it means so-called 'high culture' as a form of presentation or 
reflection. We are concerned with two stages of transcending life as such: On the 
one hand, material externalisation as realisation and formation of life and, on 
the other hand, intentional expression as presentation and reflection oflife. Sub-
suming both under the concept 'objectifications of life' and designating those as 
objects of humanistic understanding, as Dilthey does, plausibly converges them 
in both respects. For the material forms of objective spirit (such as an economic 
system) are comprehensible in terms of their inherent interpretations of life 
and, reversely, the instantiations of absolute spirit (such as a particular religion) 
equally adopt an institutional form in the world. In various cases, the two levels 
of manifestation overlap and merge into one another. Still, it is noteworthy that 
their functional roles differ. In one case, we are primarily concerned with actual 
manifestations and in the other case with instances of explication and reflex-
ive understanding. The difference reveals where the model of expression fails to 
comprise all aspects of hermeneutics. The forms of spirit are more than objecti-
fications in the sense of the manifestations of a force or the sedimentations of 
a (causally) effective nexus. Introducing the acts of manifesting and reassuring 
oneself into his concept of life-expressions, Dilthey underlines the moment of 
reflexivity that is not exhausted by formal self-reference, but extends to the cog-
nitive act of disclosing and interpreting oneself. The phenomena of culture are 
not only expressions of life, but nodes of crystallisation in the process of human 
self-explication. 
7 Double Reflexivity and lnterminability 
of Understanding 
This view exceeds the reflexive loop of understanding as it was presented in the 
beginning. More is at stake than the act of perceiving a certain instance of behav-
iour from the agent's point of view, although this certainly remains the basis and, 
in many cases, also the hinge of understanding. But there is more involved, in 
ordinary communication as well as in conducting one's life. Reflexivity is not 
only relevant with respect to the object, but also to the act and the subject of 
understanding. This becomes manifest in instances of interactive exchange in 
which communication can be hampered by impenetrability and obscurity on 
both sides, the speaker's and the hearer's. Whoever is not at peace with himself 
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has difficulties with understanding others and unravelling an intricate message 
- not for nothing is self-analysis the precondition of practicing psychoanalysis. 
A non-reductive explication of understanding must acknowledge the author and 
the reader, the speaker and the hearer as subjects who are constantly engaged in 
struggling with their own opacity and coming to terms with themselves. Gener-
ally, the constitution of sense which permeates the cultural world, thus making 
it the object of the human sciences, is a twofold reflexive and dialogical process. 
It involves acts of constituting and receiving sense, of producing, apprehending, 
interpreting and continuing contexts of sense, each of which is in need of disclo-
sure and involves acts of self-explication. 
Understanding is not simply a particular inteJlectual operation (such as a 
subsumption under a general concept, a combination or integration of elements) 
and not a kind of intuitively assimilating or empathising with another's experi-
encing either, but a kind of participating in a complex process of the reflexive 
constitution of sense. The human world, the object of the human sciences, is not 
adequately accounted for by understanding it as an assemblage of formations 
and sediments of life and materialisations of sense. It fundamentally presents 
a process, participation in which, as agents and recipients, constitutes the act 
of understanding and interpreting. Human life, as it proceeds within the dimen-
sion of culture, participates in this process by acting and speaking, receiving 
and interpreting, creating and producing. At the same time, the reflexivity of this 
process brings to bear its openness and infinity. Contemporary hermeneutics has 
emphatically called attention to this aspect of constituting sense. 
The interminability of interpreting has been addressed under different 
aspects by authors like Ricreur and Gadamer. It can find roots in what Ricreur 
describes as the inexhaustible potential to make sense inherent to symbols, texts, 
and works of art that have to be experienced and apprehended, whose meaning 
has to be disclosed and brought into shape time and again. It can equally emerge 
from the infinite mediateness of understanding, from the incongruity of the 
frameworks of language and meaning, which remains even in most successful 
acts of communicating and translating, from the irreducible otherness of I and 
You. Not least because of the subject's remaining mediate and alien to itself, 
translation and communication with others never comes to an end. Gadamer has 
carried this insight into the constitution of sense, all the way up to the formula that 
his own work on hermeneutics was essentially concerned with, "rehabilitating 
'malicious infinity"'.22 In addition, Jacques Derrida has emphasised the out-
ward non-seclusiveness of sense and called attention to the mutual permeation 
22 Gadamer, 1970a, 505; Gadamer, 1970b, 8; Gadamer, 1970c, 135. 
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of sense, medium and material, text and context, all of which he regards as ele-
ments of never-ending, deconstructive reading. 
Obviously, more contemporary authors reach beyond Dilthey's hermeneutics 
with regard to sounding and founding infinite understanding. It is, however, inter-
esting in what manner they continue Dilthey's project, to what extent they take 
up and advance his themes. Dilthey, too, emphasises the limits of understanding 
that are effective in the potential infinity of every process of understanding, 
"which can never be realised completely".23 As one reason for this infiniteness, 
he presents the fact that experiencing itself is "unfathomable" and that, hence, 
the task to illuminate and articulate it is "never-ending".24 Another reason is 
that the claim for clearly grasping another person's thoughts is unsatisfactory 
because their "individual ways of combining" is not demonstrable, but at most 
only "divinatorily" conjecturable.25 As a final and general reason, the transition 
from elemental understanding of utterances to spiritual understanding sense 
harbours various uncertainties and obscurities.26 
With regard to our guiding question, those complications which are due to 
the pursuit of self-knowledge and self-understanding are of special interest. If 
experiencing and understanding oneself constitute (are) the basis of herme-
neutics, they cannot provide their certain or transparent foundation because, 
as Dilthey laconically says, "we do not understand ourselves".27 Yet, "a man's 
pondering himself" remains the "yardstick and foundation" of understanding. 28 
It is a kind of self-pondering viewed in a certain light, as autobiographical reflec-
tion "on one's course of life", 29 that Dilthey considers here. It appears to him 
as "utmost explication" in the course of "comprehending and interpreting",30 
and he explains it with reference to classical paradigms in Augustine's, Rous-
seau's, and Goethe's works. It is a kind of negotiating one's own life by which 
one explores it in its guise, directedness, and value, which Dilthey explicates in 
its entirety in the light of historical understanding, as retrospectively becoming 
aware of oneself. Its complementary concept consists in prospectively projecting 
oneself and in finding practical orientation concerning one's own wanting and 
doing. A complete instance of coming to terms with oneself would involve taking 
23 Dilthey, 1970, 280. 
24 Dilthey, 1970, 277. 
25 Dilthey, 1970, 279. 
26 Dilthey, 1970, 259. 
27 Dilthey, 1970, 278. 
28 Dilthey, 1970, 251. 
29 Dilthey, 1970, 247. 
30 Dilthey, 1970, 251. 
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in both perspectives on one's life, the theoretical and practical, the one related to 
the past and the other related to the future. Both elements together constitute the 
reflexive momentum of the kind of understanding which, exceeding the scope of 
formal self-reference, means understanding oneself in one's own existence. That 
this constitutively belongs to the concept of understanding is one of Dilthey's 
fundamental insights forming the potential of his hermeneutics. The reflexivity of 
understanding is an essential, maybe the decisive point that is involved in deter-
mining the infiniteness of understanding and makes Dilthey's conception adapt-
able for later conceptions of understanding. 
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Towards a Performative Hermeneutics 
Wittgenstein and Husserl on the Understanding 
of Cultural Practices 
Abstract: Following Husserl's analysis of lifeworld and Wittgenstein's discussion 
of Frazer's Golden Bough, this paper addresses the understanding of cultural prac-
tices. It proceeds on the assumption that the comprehension of cultural practices is 
grounded on a unique form of understanding and cannot be reduced to other types 
of understanding. Such a form of understanding relativizes the as-structure of clas-
sical hermeneutics to describe the pre-givenness and the commitment of cultural 
practices. A description tp.at accomplishes this is called 'performative hermeneutics' 
in this article. It will here be shown that there is an understanding of commitments, 
a cultural or performative understanding, in which the as-structure does not play a 
primary role, but which becomes understandable only by canceling this structure. 
Keywords: hermeneutics, understand, cultural practices, performative herme-
neutics, commitment, comprehension 
1 Hermeneutics and Understanding of Cultural 
Practices 
Histories of reception are factually given in philosophy, but they could also be 
rearranged and re-enacted retrospectively. If, for instance, Wittgenstein's Big 
Typescript had been chosen as the major point of reference for any examination, 
Wittgenstein might have been more influential in the hermeneutical tradition. 
The Big Typescript begins with a longer passage on understanding, which is only 
then followed by various thoughts on meaning. Hermeneutics would thus stand 
prior to the theory of meaning. The same is true for Husserl. The late reflections 
from the 20s and 30s relativize the harsh criticism of Dilthey's hermeneutics and 
the so called "writers-philosophy" (Literaten-Philosophie) as it is brought forward 
by Husserl in his programmatic work Philosophy as Rigorous Science (Philosophie 
als strenge Wissenschaft). In his lecture on anthropology from 1930, Husserl calls 
phenomenology hermeneutics, even if he does so with a very distinct use of the 
term. He says: "Real analysis of consciousness is hermeneutics of the life of con-
sciousness, so to speak" (Echte Bewusstseinsanalyse ist sozusagen Hermeneutik 
Aporia / )\nopia 
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